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Abstract 
About the extent of moral agency in the animal kingdom, one view is that only 
humans are moral agents. Holding a different view, I argue that moral agency 
depends on the capacity for other-regard and the capacity to be attuned to 
significance—such that things matter to one.  I derive a criterion where a creature is 
a moral agent if she performs an action that promotes others’ significant interests 
and brings great costs to herself where she is aware of these significant interests 
and imposed costs.  Failure to confirm that she has this awareness is a weakness of 
examples of moral agency in animals that writers provide, since she may be 
unaware of the significance of what she is doing.  Since species of non-ape Primates
and aquatic mammals satisfy the evidential criterion, moral agency is likely 
prevalent throughout much of Mammalia. I consider possible objections from 
Kant, Singer, and Korsgaard. 
Introduction 
Various hypotheses are possible about a moral agent’s 
psychological capacities.  The assumption seems reasonable that the 
capacity to have thoughts about the welfare of others is, though not 
the whole story, central to moral agency.  To assist us in figuring out 
what sort of higher-order intentionality, if any, is necessary and/or 
sufficient for moral agency, it helps, first, to distinguish a higher-
order thought from a higher-order intentional state.  By a “higher­
order thought,” I mean a thought that takes a thought as its object.  
By a “higher-order intentional state,” I mean a thought that takes an 
intentional state as its object. 
Reflective and empirical evidence suggests that higher-order 
thought is unnecessary and insufficient for moral agency (with higher 
-order intentionality being necessary but not sufficient).  Reflectively 
speaking, an agent may be able to have thoughts about the mental 
states of others, which may lack significance for the agent.  Although 
psychopaths are proficient in higher-order thought, theory of mind, 
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and means-ends reasoning, experts with direct experience with 
psychopaths conclude that psychopaths are amoral (Cleckley, 1976; 
Hare, 1993).1  Moreover, normal people explain the wrongness of a 
moral violation by appeal to the victim’s distress, and they 
distinguish moral violations from conventional violations as being 
more serious, impermissible, and independent of authority (Blair 
1995); even children as young as thirty-four months of age 
distinguish moral from conventional violations (Smetana 1993).  In 
contrast, psychopaths see a moral violation such as forgery in the 
same way that they see a conventional violation such as poor 
etiquette.2  Psychopaths not only fail to distinguish moral violations 
from conventional violations, they explain them similarly, and they 
fail to appeal to the victim’s distress (Blair 1995).  The psychopath’s 
higher-order thought and amorality strongly suggest that higher-
order thought is insufficient for moral agency. 
Reflective evidence suggests that higher-order thought is 
unnecessary for moral agency, since a moral agent could care about 
others and act to reduce their discomfort by representing and acting
on the emotional or physiological states of others.  Assuming that we 
sometimes attribute emotional or physiological states without 
attributing thoughts to a newborn, we may represent and act 
similarly when we, for example, alleviate its pain.  Autism is a 
condition characterized by selective impairments in higher-order 
thought and theory of mind (Baron-Cohen 1995).  Despite these 
impairments, however, children with autism not only distinguish 
moral from conventional violations (Rogers at al. 2008), they are “as 
likely as controls [age-matched children without autism] to judge 
culpability on the basis of motive, and to judge injury to persons as 
more culpable than damage to property” (Grant et al. p. 317).  
Although these findings on psychopathy and autism suggest that 
higher-order thought is unnecessary and insufficient for moral 
agency, the capacity to have thoughts about the welfare of others may 
nevertheless be central to moral agency. 
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After making a general case for the existence of the mammalian 
mind, I propose criteria for being a moral agent and show that 
members of nonhuman species of mammals satisfy them. 
Mammals' Minds 
When humans engage in complex behaviors that do not require 
language, such as climbing a tree, hiking new mountain terrain, or 
lovemaking, the fact that we are also engaging in thought is beyond 
dispute. Since nonhuman mammals engage in similar activities in 
similar ways, by a principle of parity, they are also engaging in
thought. If they engage in thought, they have minds. 
In one example of a study of many thousands in the expansive 
literature that documents the complexity of mammals’ minds, 
researchers made audio recordings of elephants for playback to 
familiar and unfamiliar elephants (McComb 2003).  When elephants 
heard the voice of a family member while the family member was 
absent, they vocalized back and pursued the source of the sound.  If 
the family member was already present, they showed little response.  
When they heard a strange elephant, they quickly assumed a 
defensive formation and retreated from the source of the sound.  
These studies suggest that elephants are capable of auditorily 
discriminating elephants as individuals.  If they do that, they must 
have minds with a social awareness of the individual identities of 
other elephants.  Marc Hauser reports that, upon discovering food, 
rhesus monkeys who keep the discovery to themselves receive 
aggression from other monkeys.  Moreover, “Individuals were able to 
detect the discoverer amidst a group of individuals with food and 
punish just that discoverer and not additional “walk-ons,”” which 
shows that the behavior was intentional, rather than generalized 
anger (p. 12139). These findings suggest that rhesus monkeys may 
also have a social awareness of other monkeys as individuals, and 
that they have a desire to punish hoarding behavior if not also 
enforcing some sense of what a monkey should not do.  According to 
dolphin trainer Karen Pryor (2001), “Dolphins imitate each other
with or without training” and perform “repertoires that they learned 
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only by watching through a gate as the other animal performed.”  She
believes that “the capacity [of imitation] already exists in many 
species, and needs only the right environmental cues to make it 
apparent” (p. 352). Studies on mirror self-recognition behavior 
report successful mirror self-recognition in one elephant, most 
chimpanzees and bonobos, some gorillas and orangutans, two 
dolphins, and several killer whales.3  Evidence suggests that some 
levels of self-recognition are even present in the cotton-top tamarin, a
New World Monkey.4 
Studies of baboons report capacities to rotate objects mentally 
(Vauclair et al., 1993).  Based on testing and between-species 
comparisons of the results, one gorilla has a metaphorical capacity of 
the average seven-year-old human child.  Beginning in infancy, this 
gorilla was taught to use sign language, and she has used thousands 
of signs at least once. Upon first seeing a cigarette lighter, she 
spontaneously signed “bottle match,” when asked what she can think 
of that is hard, she signed “rock and work,” and when asked what an
insult is, she signed “think devil dirty” (cited in DeGrazia, p. 196-7). 
Another reason for believing that nonhuman mammals have 
minds is the similarity in the findings of human and animal 
neuropsychology.  For instance, Klüver-Bucy syndrome is a condition
that neurosurgeons created in rhesus monkeys in the 1930s by the 
unconscionable removal of the monkeys’ temporal lobes.  Although
these monkeys had apparently normal vision, they could not see the 
emotional significance of events or objects in the environment.  They 
would try, for example, to eat rats or rocks or to copulate with 
members of other species (Bourtchouladze 2004, p. 82).  Doctors 
diagnosed humans with Klüver-Bucy syndrome first in the 1950s, 
also from bilateral lesions to the temporal lobes.  The general pattern 
of symptoms was similar to that seen in the rhesus monkeys.  These 
findings suggest that, with intact temporal lobes, humans and rhesus 
monkeys normally discriminate items in their environment according 
to differing levels of emotional significance, in which case rhesus
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monkeys have minds with capacities to represent objects and events 
with emotional significance. 
An additional reason for believing that nonhumans have minds
are the commitments implied by the claims made by researchers, 
such as Donald Griffin, Jane Goodall, and Marc Hauser, who study 
and write about animal behavior.  Making sense of these researchers’
behavior and writings also requires positing animal mental 
attributes. The main reason to believe that nonhuman mammals have
minds is the fact that their behavior is intelligent and productive and 
that we need to posit a mind—a system of mental representations and
processes—to explain the data of all the studies. 
In light of the fact that mammals have minds in varying levels of 
complexity, it is clear that many complex mental capacities exist 
outside the human species.  These capacities include complex social 
awareness, self-awareness, rudimentary language, metaphorical 
capacities, and the capacity to represent emotional significance. 
Descriptive Criteria of Moral Agency 
An important assumption that I make is that morality is 
essentially a domain of significant things that matter.  If this is 
correct, then a moral agent is a being for whom things matter.  In 
other words, psychological capacities attune her to significance.  One 
capacity that is necessary for moral agency is therefore an
attunement to significance capacity—the capacity such that things 
matter to the agent.5  In distinguishing a moral from a nonmoral 
point of view, philosophers widely recognize an outlook that is 
beyond self-interest to be crucially necessary.  Another necessary 
capacity is therefore the capacity to represent the welfare of others, 
which arguably mostly consists in emotional states, such as 
psychological distress; in other words, the agent must have capacity 
for other-regarding higher-order intentionality. 
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If morality involves care and concern for others, then 
significance in others must motivate the agent’s action, and these two
capacities therefore suggest: 
The descriptive constitutive criterion: The agent performs 
an action and is motivated to perform it because she 
believes its performance supports the significant interests 
of others.6, 7 
This criterion is constitutive, as opposed to evidential, and with 
important qualifications, I offer it as a sufficient condition for being a 
moral agent. The qualifications are that it implies other abilities that 
are also necessary for moral agency. If an agent has the ability to 
surmise a situation, to form an idea of an action, to form the belief 
that performing it supports the significant interests of others, and to 
perform the action, then the agent will have a cognitive ability to 
reason and a behavioral ability to perform actions. 
Any objection to the criterion will concern whether it states a 
sufficient condition for moral agency or whether instances can be 
confirmed empirically that satisfy it. 
Although higher-order intentionality (like higher-order thought) 
is not sufficient for moral agency, it is arguably sufficient for other-
regard if it includes the capacity to represent the emotional states of 
others. The attunement to significance capacity, other-regard, an 
ability to reason, and a behavioral capacity to perform actions are 
arguably the least necessary elements of moral agency. 
An objection is that the descriptive constitutive criterion is 
incapable of being confirmed.  This objection is valid; the descriptive 
constitutive criterion is difficult to confirm, since it requires knowing 
about a motivationin the context of the agent’s belief that an action’s 
performance supports the significant interests of others.  To 
overcome this difficulty, we must discard claims about the agent’s 
motivation and belief and require that her action bring great costs to 
herself. This emendation is imperfect, since bringing a cost to self is 
not necessary for an action to be a moral action.  Moreover, an 
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action’s bringing costs to the agent and benefits to others is not 
sufficient to make it a moral action, since she may be unaware of the 
significance of what she is doing.  Failure to rule out this possibility 
makes for a serious weakness of virtually all alleged examples of 
moral agency in animals. 
An action that brings great costs to one and benefits to others is 
only a “candidate” moral action, and it might suggest that the one 
performing it is a moral agent.  For assuranceof moral agency, 
however, an action must satisfy a stricter criterion: 
The descriptive evidential criterion: The agent performs 
an action that promotes others’ significant interests and
brings great costs to herself, and we must confirm that she
is aware that she brings great costs to herself and 
benefits to others.8,9 
When her action satisfies the descriptive evidential criterion, we 
know that she is aware that she brings great costs to herself and 
benefits to others. When the agent is aware that her action brings 
great costs to herself and benefits to others, we know that the reason 
for benefiting others is more important to her than the reason she has
to avoid bringing the costs to herself.  When the costs to self are 
great, we know that bringing benefits to others—promoting others’ 
significant interests—matters greatly to her.  We have very good 
reason therefore to believe that she performed a moral action, and I 
will call it a “moral act with assurance”. 
Examples 
Sperm whales: In October 1997 and 80 miles off the coast of 
California, marine biologists documented instances of sperm whales 
(Physeter macrocephalus) defending themselves from the attacks of 
killer whales (Orcinus orca). In the first instance, nine sperm whales 
defended themselves against thirty-five killer whales using a rosette 
with heads in the center and tails defending the perimeter.  The killer 
whales attacked repeatedly for four hours, each attack spilling sperm 
whale blood and body oil into the water.  Every time they succeeded 
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in pulling a sperm whale from the protective rosette, one or two 
sperm whales left the rosette, joined the attacked sperm whale, 
placed themselves between the sperm whale and the attacking killer 
whales, and led the attacked sperm whale back into the rosette, even 
though, this led instantly to the killer whales viciously attacking them
(p. 500). At least three and possibly all nine sperm whales received 
fatal wounds. 
Five days later, the marine biologists sighted two groups of five 
sperm whales about a kilometer apart and a group of five killer 
whales swimming toward one of the groups.  When the killer whales 
were about a kilometer from a sperm whale group, that sperm whale 
group submerged for less than a minute and signaled to sperm 
whales in surrounding waters using a distress call.  Immediately, the
five sperm whales of the other group “started traveling rapidly 
toward” them (p. 501). Additional sperm whales heard the distress 
call, and the fifteen sperm whales that soon formed the group 
appeared “vigilant with their heads raised from the water facing 
different directions, and some of them were slapping the water with 
their tails” (p. 501). The killer whales began attacking, causing severe
injuries. But, the researchers spotted additional groups of sperm 
whales as far as seven kilometers away traveling rapidly to join the 
group. When more sperm whales joined the group, they formed 
different shapes: a “raft-like” shape when twenty in number, a 
“spindle” shape when thirty in number, and when the sperm whale 
group was fifty strong, the killer whales ceased attacks and shortly 
thereafter were kilometers away (p. 502). 
To confirm that an agent is aware of her action’s costs and 
benefits, we may look to general considerations, such as the known 
cognitive, emotional, and social intelligences of the species, along 
with more specific considerations local to the setting of an action. 
Both sperm whale behaviors—leaving the protective rosette and 
joining the group under attack—are moral acts with assurance.  
Sperm whales being a highly intelligent species of Cetacea with 
exceptional echolocation and sensory acuity, researchers believe that 
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sperm whales can discern predatory intent before killer whales attack
(Whitehead 2003). They can feel, see, and possibly smell themselves 
bleeding and spilling body oil into the water.  Given that they 
continually echolocate to create three-dimensional images of their 
environment, including the killer whales as well as their own lost 
blood and body oil, and given that they had four hours to echolocate, 
see, and passively listen while the killer whales attacked, there is no 
basis for reasonable doubt that these sperm whales knew with 
certainty that killer whales were attacking them. 
An attack by killer whales is worse when a sperm whale is 
outside the rosette than when she is inside its protection, and the 
attacks are more frequent. The fact that the sperm whales formed the
rosette, sought its protection, and left it only when doing so helped 
them to return a sperm whale back into its protection shows that they 
know that being in the rosette is preferable and that leaving it will 
likely cause killer whales to attack them severely.  A sperm whale 
therefore knows that an attack by killer whales is a significant cost.  
Likewise, a sperm whale knows that by leading a sperm whale back
into the rosette, she benefits that sperm whale. In the first encounter,
by leaving the protective rosette, a sperm whale knowingly brings 
great costs to herself and knowingly benefits another sperm whale.  
Their actions therefore satisfy the requirement that they are aware 
that their actions bring great costs to themselves and benefits to 
others. Their actions therefore satisfy the descriptive evidential 
criterion for moral agency.  Conclusively, it is shown that sperm 
whales are moral agents. 
The second encounter further corroborates this conclusion, since
the behavior is similar at the group level and involves groups that are
between one and seven kilometers away joining the group that killer 
whales are attacking. In humans, this would be like one group 
choosing to join and assist another group that headhunters are 
attacking with predatory intent when they could have easily fled.  If a 
human group acted in this manner, we would arguably not hesitate to
declare that it is a moral act with assurance. 
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One might object that none of the actions shows moral agency 
with assurance because natural (gene, kin, or group) selection may 
explain the behavior of the sperm whales. 
This is not an objection to my argument because my argument 
concerns proximate causes—moral motivations.  And the objection 
concerns ultimate causes—the reasons behavior evolved.  That
clarification shows that this objection based on ultimate causes does 
not challenge my claim that sperm whales are motivated to promote 
the significant interests of other sperm whales, since my claim 
concerns proximate causes not ultimate causes.10 
One may object that none of the actions shows moral agency 
because, in each instance, the sperm whale performing the action 
might be an immediate family member of the individual or 
individuals that she benefits. Due to the extensive degree to which 
one is emotionally invested in family, such an action is a self-
interested action, in which case, it is not a moral action. 
Since sperm whale mothers birth a single calf every few years 
(Whitehead 2003), in order for the fifty group members in the second
encounter to be immediate family, a mother would need to bear 
young with a zero mortality rate for hundreds of years. Since a 
female is fertile for a few decades, the fifty group members are not 
immediate family, and the objection is rebutted.  Moreover, “sperm 
whale groups are not themselves particularly stable, often consisting 
of two or more largely matrilineal units that swim together for 
periods of days... [and] These social units may themselves split or 
merge” (Rendell and Whitehead, 2001, p. 315).  Therefore, although 
in some cases, the sperm whale performing the action might be a 
family member, it is not possible that this is always the case.  
Moreover, if a family member or a friend might have performed some
of the moral acts with assurance, this is not the basis of an 
insurmountable objection even against these, since it depends on the
disputable claim that filial bonds cannot be the source of moral 
reasons. Robert Nozick (1981) and Christina Hoff Sommers (1986) 
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argue compellingly that filial bonds can be the source of strong moral 
reasons. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that the relative 
cost of an action may outweigh considerations of filial bonds.  An
action for a family member with a low cost to self will usually be a 
weak example of moral agency, while an action with a high cost to self 
may be a strong example.  For instance, placing oneself between a 
family member and an attacking predator or joining a group under
predatory attack is a strong example.  Since the sperm whales’ actions
are the stronger type, sperm whales perform moral acts with 
assurance and are therefore moral agents. 
Rhesus monkeys: The experimenters tested rhesus monkeys in
pairs with one monkey as the operator and another monkey as the 
stimulus animal. Two adjacent chambers are the operator’s box and 
the stimulus animal’s box. The operator’s box contains two chains 
that deliver food when pulled, one delivering a tiny amount (enough 
that pulling the chain is, although worthwhile, not enough to reduce 
their growing hunger), the other delivering a large amount. The 
stimulus animal box’s floor is an electric grid that delivers high 
frequency electroshocks through a monkey’s feet.  A one-way visual 
barrier divides the operator’s box from the stimulus animal box, and 
it allows a monkey in the operator box to see inside the stimulus 
animal box, but not vice versa. 
After training, all the monkeys could work the apparatus well.  
Researchers began the experiment 22 hours after withholding all 
food. If the monkey in the operator box pulled the chain delivering a 
tiny amount of food, she received it.  If she pulled the chain delivering 
the large amount of food, she received the food, and the monkey in 
the stimulus animal box received a high frequency electroshock 
through her feet. 
When the other side of the box was vacant, all monkeys operated
the apparatus without hesitation.  Once a monkey was in the stimulus
animal box, however, they were reluctant to pull the chains.  Some 
refrained entirely. This is an instance of moral agency in other
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species mitigating the suffering that results from unethical animal 
experimentation. 
I will refer to monkeys in the operator box as “naïve” if they had 
never been shocked in the stimulus animal box, and “experienced” if 
they had been shocked. The study found that naïve monkeys went 
with tiny amounts of food for 1.2 days, on average, while experienced 
monkeys went with tiny amounts of food for 7.6 days, on average, a 
difference that is statistically significant (p<0.01).  One experienced 
monkey endured complete hunger for five days refraining from 
pulling any chains. Another endured complete hunger for twelve 
days (Masserman, 1964, p. 584).  The studies clearly show several 
things. A majority of rhesus monkeys (25 of 33) prefer to bring great 
costs to themselves prolonging their extreme hunger—in order to 
promote other monkeys’ significant interests by giving them a refuge 
from further torture.11  In addition, experiencing a shock had a 
significant effect. 
Showing that the rhesus monkeys were aware of the costs to self 
and benefits to others is straightforward.  It is beyond dispute that 
rhesus monkeys understand the relation of hunger to eating—one of 
the most basic items of knowledge for a rhesus monkey.  We can be 
certain that they are aware of the costs to self, since they are fully 
trained on the apparatus and were tested to ensure that they 
understood the reward pairings of the chains to amounts of delivered 
food.  The fact that naïve monkeys had no food for 22 hours and 
chose, nevertheless, to endure even greater hunger for more than 
another day in order to avoid shocking the adjacent monkey shows 
that even though they had not experienced shock, they were sensitive 
to the behavior of the adjacent monkey, who would show 
dramatically increased bodily activity, thrashing of limbs, frantic 
jumping, and grimacing and vocalizations, all which occurs 
immediately after pulling the chain for the large amount of food.  
There is no reasonable basis for doubt therefore that when the 
stimulus animal monkey is present, the operator is aware that pulling 
the chain that administers a large amount of food results in two 
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things—receiving a large amount of food and the adjacent monkey 
receiving pain.  The monkeys are aware, therefore, of the costs and 
benefits. 
Experienced monkeys know with certainty, of course, that the 
consequence for the adjacent monkey is the pain and distress that 
results from a shock.  Naïve monkeys and especially experienced 
monkeys are therefore aware of the costs to self and benefits to others
of the courses of action available to them, and their actions therefore 
satisfy the descriptive evidential criterion.  The rhesus monkeys 
perform moral acts with assurance, and therefore, rhesus monkeys 
are moral agents. 
Monkeys were housed three to a cage for one year before the 
experiment, and if a monkey in the operator box was the cagemate of 
the monkey in the stimulus animal box, he was willing to suffer worse
hunger to avoid harming the monkey in the stimulus animal box with
whom he lived than to avoid harming a strange monkey.  Although 
this effect was not statistically significant (p = 0.07), it approached 
statistical significance.  These findings are consistent with a human 
preference for persons with whom we share a filial bond, and 
assuming that our having these slight preferences does not challenge 
the foundation of moral agency in humans, then it also should not 
challenge it in rhesus monkeys. 
An objection is that the study does not rule out the possibility 
that the monkeys were motivated out of a fear of retaliation, and if 
they were so motivated, then their behavior is not moral.  If fear of 
retaliation were the motive, however, we would expect to see an 
increase in behavioral indications of things associated with such fear, 
such as dominance. Researchers showed with additional 
experiments, however, that there was no effect of dominance on the 
observed behaviors. Moreover, a stranger is equally or more likely to 
retaliate. Being a former cagemate of the operator monkey, however, 
protected a monkey some.  Most importantly, being hungry for days 
is a long time to be hungry, even for a human, and the urgency of the 
present is strong during times of prolonged discomfort.  It is simply 
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implausible therefore that a monkey, or a human for that matter, 
might be motivated so strongly by thoughts of future possible 
scenarios while in the present grip of unrelenting discomfort. 
General Objections 
The two examples are proof that nonhuman mammals satisfy the
evidential criterion for moral agency, which I defend as being 
sufficient for moral agency. I am likely to receive a certain type of 
counterargument that defends the view that, regardless of the 
examples of animal behavior, only humans are moral agents. 
An objection is that the sperm whales and rhesus monkeys’ 
actions are, although compassionate, caring, and kind actions, not 
motivated by a categorical imperative.  The agent must assign herself 
a categorical or unconditional imperative based on duty—what it is 
right to do as determined by practical reason and apart from 
inclination. For it to be moral agency, the action must be motivated 
by a concern for the welfare of the other qua other—a source of 
concern (or in terms of the present discussion, a “source of 
significance”). There is not sufficient evidence that the sperm whales 
or rhesus monkeys are motivated by anything beyond compassion, 
care, and kindness. 
In rebutting this sort of objection, it is first important to ask, 
perhaps if only rhetorically, If the evidence I provided is not sufficient
to show that rhesus monkeys and sperm whales are motivated from
duty or something similar, then what sort of evidence would?  
Although Kant’s moral theory defines duty, his theory is generally 
understood to lack an account for how to confirm empirically when 
actions are performed from duty. In other words, stated in terms 
familiar to the present discussion, Kant’s theory is taken to provide 
constitutive criteria of duty but no evidential criteria. Kant even
warns that it would be speculation to claim that an action was 
actually motivated from duty because the mind and motives are never
fully knowable. 
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Despite those considerations, Kant seems to provide evidential 
criteria for performing a moral action.  These center around his 
notion of the imputation of an action, which is a vital notion in Kant’s 
The Metaphysics of Morals,12 and Kant states that “Imputation 
(imputatio) in the moral sense is the judgment by which someone is 
regarded as the author... of an action” (p. 19).  Kant explains that 
“Subjectively, the degree to which an action can be imputed 
(imputabilitas) has to be assessed by the magnitude of the obstacles 
that had to be overcome” (ibid.).  And, an example that Kant gives is 
“The greater the natural obstacles (of sensibility) and the less the 
moral obstacle (of duty), so much the more merit is to be accounted
for a good deed, as when, for example, at considerable self-sacrifice I 
rescue a complete stranger from great distress” (ibid.).  I suggest that 
imputation is a descriptive evidential criterion of duty in the sense 
that it concerns the actual conditions of attribution of moral worth to 
an action. Furthermore, by a principle of parity, the moral acts with 
assurance that the rhesus monkeys and sperm whales performed 
satisfy Kant’s (descriptive evidential) criterion of imputabilitas. The 
rhesus monkeys have a very great natural obstacle in hunger.  In 
addition, it would be very easy for them to pull the chain that delivers 
a large amount of food.  The sperm whales in both encounters have 
great natural obstacles in the killer whales that are attacking them.  
In addition, it would be very easy for them to remain in the protective 
rosette in the first encounter and to flee the area in the second 
encounter. Consequently, when “assessed by the magnitude of the 
obstacles that had to be overcome,” the rhesus monkeys and sperm 
whales may be regarded as the author of their good deeds. In a word, 
their actions may be said to be motivated by duty or something like 
duty. 
One might object that the essence of morality resides in some 
capacity that, for one, only humans have, and for another, that sperm 
whales and rhesus monkeys do not exhibit.  I will consider two 
possible forms of this objection, one based on Peter Singer’s view and
another based on Christine Korsgaard’s view. 
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One might object that the capacity to reason is advanced in 
humans over that of other animals to such a degree that it affords 
humans with capacities that all other animals lack and that such 
capacities are the basis for moral agency.  Therefore, humans and no 
other animals are moral agents. Singer offers such an argument in
his response to primatologist Frans de Waal’s Tanner lectures.  
Singer writes, 
In The Expanding Circle, I suggested that it is our 
developed capacity to reason that gives us the ability to 
take the impartial perspective.  As reasoning beings, we 
can abstract from our own case and see that others,
outside our group have interests similar to our own.  We 
can also see that there is no impartial reason why their 
interests should not count as much as the interests of 
members of our own group, or indeed as much as our own
interests. Does this mean that the idea of impartial 
morality is contrary to our evolved nature?  Yes, if by “our 
evolved nature” we mean the nature that we share with 
the other social mammals from which we evolved.  No 
nonhuman animals, not even the other great apes, come 
close to matching our capacity to reason.  So if this
capacity to reason does lie behind the impartial element of 
our morality, it is something new in evolutionary history 
(p. 145). 
And later Singer states that “[perhaps] we can reject [our initial] 
emotional responses. . . only on the basis of other emotional 
responses, but the process involves reason and abstraction, and may 
lead us... to a morality that is more impartial than our evolutionary 
history as social mammals would—in the absence of that reasoning 
process—allow” (p. 150). 
Developing Singer’s line of thought into a complete objection, 
the idea is that an impartial morality depends on a humanlike
capacity to reason. Since other social mammals, such as rhesus 
monkeys and sperm whales, have a much underdeveloped reasoning 
capacity when compared to humans, members of such species are 
incapable of abstracting from their own case and seeing that others
outside their group (or individual situation, presumably) have similar
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interests to their own. Rhesus monkeys and sperm whales therefore 
cannot take an impartial perspective.  Since according to Singer 
(1993, p. 12) the impartial perspective is the mark of the moral, social 
mammals such as rhesus monkeys or sperm whales are not moral 
agents. 
Such an objection may be rebutted.  The objection’s first premise
is that no nonhuman animals come close to matching our capacity to 
reason. Second, the capacity to reason lies behind the impartial 
element of our morality.  Third, the impartial perspective is necessary 
to morality. From these claims, however, it would be a mistake to
infer that only humans have any impartial element of morality.  
Singer’s “impartial perspective” is most plausible when understood as
a perspective that can have varying degrees of impartiality, since it 
must be a psychological capacity that will vary in its development 
between humans and within the same human over time.  Sperm 
whales and rhesus monkeys adopt perspectives that are somewhere 
on a continuum of impartiality, so the question is whether the degree 
to which they have it is enough for moral agency.  I believe the 
answer is “yes.” In the second encounter with killer whales, sperm 
whales up to seven kilometers away swam to join the sperm whale 
group being attacked. In the first encounter of sperm whales and 
killer whales and in the rhesus monkey experiments, the moral 
agents adopted a perspective that was sufficiently impartial with 
regard to themselves in relation to one or more other animals such 
that they acted on the other’s interests which they did despite their 
having a pressing self-interest or need. They knowingly underwent 
great hardship or costs to self in order to bring benefits, or avoid 
bringing harms, to the other. If these are not instances of “seeing 
that others outside [their] group have interests similar to [their] 
own,” then neither Singer nor I must know what is.  Even if we 
assume that humans are unmatched in their reasoning abilities, 
members of many species of mammal are, nevertheless, moral 
agents. 
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One might object that in order to perform a moral action, one 
must be autonomous and freely choose to perform it; sperm whales 
and rhesus monkeys might not be entirely free to choose to perform 
any actions.  Although animals, according to Kant, have sensation 
and choice (1996, p. 192), they always choose one inclination over 
other inclinations.13  Christine Korsgaard claims that “the capacity for 
normative self-government [/autonomy] requires...a certain form of 
self-consciousness: namely, consciousness of the grounds on which 
you propose to act as grounds” (p. 113). A nonhuman is conscious of 
the object that he fears or desires “as fearful or desirable, and so as 
something to be avoided or sought” (p. 113).  Korsgaard claims, 
however, that “a rational animal is, in addition, conscious that she 
fears or desires the object, and that she is inclined to act in a certain 
way as a result” (p. 113).  Her argument is that humans “do not 
merely have intentions [but] assess and adopt them” (p. 113), and it is 
that sort of capacity that morality is centered on and that only 
humans have. Since “it is at this level that morality emerges” (p. 113) 
and since “the capacity for normative self-government... is probably 
unique to human beings...” (p. 116), it follows that humans and no 
animals have morality. 
The first and most obvious, and perhaps the strongest, basis for 
rebutting Korsgaard’s objection is in the fact that the primary basis 
for her distinction between animals and humans is higher-order 
thought. One’s being “conscious that . . . [one has an emotional state 
or ground for action]” is higher-order thought.  While being aware 
that it is always possible to build into a moral theory such complexity 
or high-level thought that virtually no one would actually satisfy its 
requirements, I point out that I have already suggested that higher-
order thought is neither necessary nor sufficient for moral agency.  
Korsgaard claims that “it is at this level [being conscious of the 
ground of your beliefs] that morality emerges.”  She does not provide 
reason for believing, however, that morality emerges only at that 
point, as opposed to just developing to a higher-level.  For another, 
although she prefaces her argument with claims to the contrary,14 her 
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argument does suffer from the common error of pretending to 
provide answers to open empirical questions.  In addition to 
suggesting that the empirical evidence shows that higher-order 
thought, such as consciousness of the grounds of your beliefs, is 
unnecessary and insufficient for moral agency, I suggest that these 
capacities are psychological capacities had as a matter of degree, and 
as has been shown, nonhuman mammals have them in varying 
degrees. 
Expecting a moral philosopher that is (confessedly) 
unacquainted with the empirical literature on animal behavior to 
decide whether any animals satisfy the criteria for moral agency is 
like expecting an aeronautical engineer to determine whether any 
animals are capable of flying a plane.  The engineer may argue 
compellingly that only humans could fly a plane, but these arguments
are beside the point if I produce animals that fly planes.  Since I have 
produced animals that perform moral acts with assurance, the 
arguments of Kant, Singer, and Korsgaard that animals do not are 
beside the point. Regardless of the merits of their arguments in their 
own right, they are ineffective.  I conclude that, despite their 
arguments to the contrary, moral agency exists in other species such 
as rhesus monkeys and sperm whales. 
Concluding Remarks 
The founder of cognitive ethology Donald Griffin points out that 
the touchstone of credibility for animal behavioral evidence is 
unprecedentedly unfair. In other areas of science, data are weighed 
and assessed reasonably. In animal behavioral studies, unusually 
strict criteria must be satisfied in order for the data to count as real 
evidence. 
It is for this reason that I have argued the way I have, and I have 
succeeded in showing that members of both aquatic and land species 
of mammals satisfy the descriptive evidential criterion.  Since the 
descriptive evidential criterion is stricter than the descriptive 
constitutive criterion, while the descriptive constitutive criterion is 
  
 
 
 
 
20
the more accurate criterion, it is likely that members of many species 
of mammals are moral agents, at least according to the framework I 
provided for moral agency.  Moreover, the proofs and arguments that 
I have given of moral agency in nonhuman mammals casts a new look
on how to interpret compelling examples of what are “candidate” 
actions according to my criteria.  For instance, elephant researchers
document numerous instances of elephants assisting injured or 
disabled elephants and rhinoceroses (Hart et al., 2008, p. 91).  
Though the costs to self may be small costs to self are not necessary 
for the constitutive criterion (they are only necessary evidentially), 
and it is highly likely that elephants would do these things even if the 
costs to self were greater. Finally, the same applies to hundreds of
other instances of behavior in many other species of mammals.  In 
conclusion, social mammals such as rhesus monkeys and sperm 
whales, and likely including the members of many other species, are 
moral agents. 
Notes 
1. Throughout his decades of psychiatric practice evaluating and 
treating ‘many hundred psychopaths’ (p. 188), Cleckley reports that 
he was never able to uncover “a sense of guilt or remorse (conscious 
or unconscious) in any of the psychopaths” that he studied (p. 131). 
2. See Hare (2006) and Blair (1995) for review. Shaun Nichols (2002)
reviews evidence to show that the capacity to make the 
moral/conventional distinction “indicates a basic capacity for moral 
judgment” (p. 222). 
3. See Delfour and Marten (2001) for killer whale stage 4 mirror self-
recognition, see Hart et al. (2008) for review of elephants, dolphins, 
and primates. 
4. Hauser and his colleagues dyed the hair on top of their head, which
is a highly salient feature of their appearance.  This produced self-
directed mirror behavior in them: “Only individuals with dyed hair 
and prior mirror exposure touched their head while looking in the 
mirror” (Hauser et al., 1995, p. 10811). 
5. An animal may achieve a strong sense of psychological significance 
without any added complexity of thought. Positing an attunement to 
significance capacity in moral agents may, inversely, help to explain 
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the existence of the psychopath since he lacks significance in himself 
(see Cleckley, 1976). Cleckley describes the psychopath’s central 
deficit as an inability to experience life with the meaning and 
importance that define life for others (p. 371), which is similar to 
lacking an attunement to significance capacity. 
6. In addition to including the condition “performs an action,” this 
criterion also implicitly includes the condition of refraining from 
performing an action. 
7. Since, as Cleckley explains, the pure psychopath’s lack of personal 
significance prevents the psychopath from being able to acknowledge 
that others have significant interests, the psychopath cannot be 
motivated to act to support the significant interests of others, and 
thus fails the descriptive constitutive condition. Given the severe 
impairments that psychopaths show when it comes to what we deem 
moral behavior and moral attitudes, the psychopath’s failure to 
satisfy this criterion is evidence that the descriptive constitutive 
criterion describes something that is possibly developmentally 
necessary for moral agency. 
8. As with the previous criterion, this criterion also implicitly includes
the condition of refraining from performing an action.  The transition 
from the constitutive to the evidential criterion is a loss of precision 
because an agent is a moral agent by virtue of the nature and content 
of the agent’s motives and beliefs (it is not necessary that an action 
bring a cost to self for it to be a moral action). Some opportunity cost 
to self may be implied in any action that supports others, since 
performing an action that supports others may prevent performing 
other actions that support oneself. 
9. Satisfying it is possible without higher-order thought, as an agent 
may estimate costs to self and benefits to others with basic reasoning 
abilities and find significant interests in others with only higher-order
intentionality. The more significant the costs to self, the better is the 
evidence of moral agency. 
10. In any case, the objection to moral agency on the grounds of 
evolutionary pressure fares poorly in this case with sperm whales. 
The behavior of the sperm whales resulted in an exponentially greater
number of casualties than would self-interested behavior. Thirty-five 
killer whales cannot consume more flesh in one feeding than that 
which is contained in one sperm whale. Were the sperm whales to 
behave according to a ‘cold shoulder’ policy, collectively seeking 
refuge in the rosette even when a fellow sperm whale was forced out 
by predators, then only a single sperm whale would have perished. In 
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short, helping members who are pulled out of the rosette is not 
adaptive for the self or the species. 
11. At least, rhesus monkeys as experimental subjects since some 
might have participated in more than one study 
12. Although The Metaphysics of Morals is less popular, Kant wrote 
it later in his life and over a much longer time. 
13. Kant was mistaken to make such claims about what are open 
empirical questions. 
14. Christine Korsgaard writes, “although I believe the capacity for 
autonomy is characteristic of human beings and unique to human 
beings, the question how far in the animal kingdom that capacity 
extends is certainly an empirical one” (p. 112-113). 
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